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ABSTRACT

Plato's Crito depicts Socrates in prison awaiting his execution and arguing that despite
the injustice of his sentence, he is morally obligated to remain there so that it can be carried out.
The early Socratic dialogues were concerned with the nature of the virtues which formed the
foundation of Athenian morals. This "primacy of virtue" has developed into the modern theory
of virtue ethics. In this thesis, I argue that in the Crito, Socrates sets aside his typical virtue
ethics approach, and instead utilizes a deontological framework for his arguments. I apply the
deontological theories of Immanuel Kant and W. D. Ross to the Crito in an attempt to
demonstrate that it has a distinctly duty-based focus that is consistent with the work of Kant and
Ross. Finally, I raise the question of whether Ross' theory can be viewed as a bridge between
virtue ethics and deontological ethics.
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INTRODUCTION

As a person, our knowledge of Socrates is limited. As an historical figure, we have the
biographical facts of his life, but these do not tell us about the character, disposition, or
motivations of Socrates the man. For that, we must rely on the writings of his contemporaries.
Plato offers us a complimentary portrayal of a man he revered, the playwright Aristophanes
ridiculed him in The Clouds, 1 and Xenophon depicted a Socrates who was as much concerned
with physical matters as he was philosophical ones. 2
For my thesis, I chose to work with Plato's Socrates, and as others before me,
immediately encountered what is called the "Socratic Problem." Plato wrote what are thought to
be relatively accurate accounts of Socrates' encounters, conversations, and views. Plato also,
especially as he got older, wrote dialogues that feature Socrates as the main character, but
espoused what were clearly Plato's own views. Thus, the Socratic Problem: Of Plato's body of
work, which texts can we safely assume represent Socrates' own views?
This is a particularly relevant issue for this project, as I am attempting to characterize
Socrates' position in the Crito as significantly different from his typical position. If I include the
dialogues that present Plato's philosophy, I am no longer able to contrast Socrates with Socrates.

At the start of the play The Clouds, Socrates is sitting in a basket suspended in the air because he believes that he
could not understand "the things of heaven" if he had remained on the ground, "for the earth by its force attracts the
sap of the mind to itself. It's just the same with the watercress." During the play, he worships the clouds as if they
are deities, denies the existence of the Zeus and the other Olympian gods, and accepts payment for teaching the "art
of false reasoning."
2
In Xenophon's Socrates' Defense Before the Jury, Socrates' motivation for not preparing a defense for his trial is
that he would be pleading for "in place of death, a much worse life." This life would hold the indignities of old age,
leading to a "miserable death in sickness or old age, where every kind of cheerless suffering is concentrated" (8-9).
1

1

Socratic scholars, the most prominent among them Gregory Vlastos, have approached the
Socratic Problem by categorizing the dialogues according to at what point in Plato's life they
were written, generally noted as the early, middle, and late periods. The early dialogues can be
safely assumed to represent accurately Socrates' views. The late dialogues are distinctly Platonic
and these are judged to hold Plato's own views. The middle dialogues share characteristics of
both the early and late dialogues, and cannot be definitively categorized as one or the other. In
an effort to ensure that it is solely Socrates' views that I am comparing, I rely only on the early
dialogues. The early dialogues are the Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias
Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras, and Republic I. 3
My primary focus is on the Crito, which takes place after Socrates has been sentenced to
death and while he is in prison awaiting his execution, which is going to occur in the next few
days. The trial itself is depicted in the Apology, and it is there that we see Socrates attempt (and
ultimately fail) to defend himself from the charges of "corrupting the young and of not believing
in the gods in whom the city believes, but other new spiritual things" (Ap. 24b). In the Crito,
Socrates' friend Crito comes to visit and brings news that several of Socrates' friends, Crito
included, have a plan to bribe the guards, smuggle Socrates out of prison, and resettle him in
another country (Cr. 44e-45c). Socrates objects to this plan on moral grounds, and the remainder
of the dialogue consists of Socrates trying to convince Crito that escaping would be the wrong
thing to do. In the end, Crito is forced to agree.

3

Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 46.
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In this paper I argue that Socrates, whose typical philosophical approach is a precursor of
contemporary virtue ethics, in the Crito adopts and relies on arguments consistent with
deontological ethics. In chapter 1, I provide a brief overview of contemporary virtue ethics and
its relationship to ancient conceptions of virtue. I detail Socrates' approach to virtue, specifically
focusing on the relationship of virtue to happiness and the Socratic concept of the Unity of the
Virtues. I conclude by discussing the common interpretation of the Crito, which is a virtuebased one.
In chapter 2 I propose that, in the Crito, Socrates' three main arguments are consistent
with deontological theory, not virtue ethics. I discuss Kant's ethical theory, the best known
version of deontological ethics. This discussion centers on the four formulations of Kant's
Categorical Imperative. I note that there are deontologists who object to some of the
implications of Kant's theory, among them W. D. Ross. Ross developed a form of deontology
based on the concept of prima facie duties. I provide an overview of Ross' theory and
summarize the differences between Ross and Kant. Finally, I outline specific instances in the
Crito where Socrates' language reflects a mixture of Kant's ethics and Ross' theory of prima facie
duties.
In chapter 3, I offer an in-depth analysis of three of Socrates' arguments in the Crito.
They are the Arguments from Injury, Piety, and Agreement, each of which takes the form of a
universalizable maxim. For each argument, I identify the ways it reflects deontological ethics,
and through which particular form of deontology it can best be understood. I propose that the
Argument from Injury is based on a form of universalization similar to the Categorical
Imperative, the Argument from Piety consists of an absolutist rule, and the Argument from

3

Agreement features a precursor of pure procedural justice. I ultimately argue that without their
deontological frameworks, these arguments would fail.
My project is not to solve a problem of ethics or present a theory that can be applied, but
to offer an alternative view of Socrates' arguments in the Crito. It is not my intention to endorse
any of Socrates' arguments or decision-making processes. In fact, based on Socrates' views in
the other early dialogues, I do not believe that he himself would have endorsed absolutist
principles that do not and cannot allow for considering the consequences of an action. Like
contemporary critics of pure procedural justice, I suspect that Socrates would have found a
system of justice that grants the right supremacy over the good to be deficient at best, and more
likely completely devoid of virtue. When Michael Oakeshott decries the overwhelming
influence of Rationalism in politics and daily life, it is this type of a system against which he is
railing. It is a system that values reason over all else, and completely discounts "the traditional
knowledge of … society." 4 Oakeshott argues that this allows individuals without any experience
or learned wisdom (what Oakeshott calls "practical knowledge") to believe themselves fully
capable of engaging in any pursuit, as long as they can follow the specified procedures. Given
that, for Socrates, "practical wisdom is really the only virtue," 5 any system that denies or
minimizes its relevance would have been unacceptable.

4
5

Oakeshott, 3.
Devettere, 65. I discuss the relationship between virtue and knowledge in chapter 1.

4

CHAPTER 1: SOCRATES, VIRTUE, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Socrates is generally accepted to be a foundational force behind the development of what
we have come to call "virtue ethics." However, as Pence points out, "it is impossible to
understand modern virtue theory" without understanding its ancient foundations in Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle. 6 I do not intend to dispute that Socrates' positions 7 are on the whole
grounded in notions of virtue. However, in Plato's Crito, Socrates' arguments have little, if
anything, to do with virtue. Instead, Socrates' arguments are based on absolutist claims, which
have far more in common with deontology than with virtue ethics. I will argue that in the Crito,
Socrates utilizes a type of deontology as the framework for his arguments, and that his
conclusions rest entirely on the rules that he asserts as immutable. The very nature of his
arguments and that he does assert rules is in itself an indication that Socrates was not relying on
virtue ethics in the Crito, as virtue ethics is not a rule-based theory.
In what follows, when I refer to Socrates' positions, I am referring to Socrates' arguments
and actions as found in Plato's early dialogues. Although we cannot ignore the Socratic problem,
I am following Gregory Vlastos, among others, in the view that many of Plato's earlier dialogues
were accurate accounts of Socrates' own positions. I am particularly swayed by Vlastos'
argument regarding the Apology, that "hundreds of those who might read the speech he put into
the mouth of Socrates had heard the historic original. And since his purpose in writing it was to

6

Pence, 251-2. See also Gardiner, 1.
I refer to Socrates' "positions" throughout because, as I will argue, I believe that Socrates had more than one
unified system of thought. In particular, his arguments and theories in the Crito are noticeably different in form and
function from the majority of his other work.
7
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clear his master's name and to indict his judges, it would have been most inept to make Socrates
talk out of character." 8
Socrates was invested in the idea that being a person of virtue is necessary to having a
good life. This perspective was adopted by Plato, and more fully developed by Aristotle.
Despite its ancient roots, until the 1950s, virtue ethics was primarily ignored or discounted in
contemporary philosophy. 9 Since that time, virtue ethics has become a subject of serious study,
and has emerged as a third major branch of normative ethics, along with deontology and
utilitarianism. 10 In addition, its emergence has led to a re-examination of the role of virtues in
deontology and utilitarianism. 11
The primary principle behind virtue ethics is that virtuous actions will result from one's
character, so one must be a good, virtuous person. As Statman put it, virtue ethics is an approach
in which "the basic judgments in ethics are judgments about character." 12 Virtue ethics holds
itself in opposition to deontology and utilitarianism in one fundamental way. Both deontology
and utilitarianism, which Statman groups together under the term "duty ethics," are concerned
with "right action" and are based on formulating rules that allow people to determine what the
right action would be when faced with any given moral dilemma. In contrast, some formulations
of virtue ethics make "right" and "wrong" unintelligible notions. In her 1958 article, "Modern

8

Vlastos, "The Paradox of Socrates, 3.
Statman, 2-3.
10
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 3.
11
Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics."
12
Statman, 7.
9
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Moral Philosophy," 13 Anscombe proposed eliminating the concepts of "morally right and wrong,
and of the moral sense of ought," 14 and instead returning to an Aristotelian understanding of
ethics based on character, personal excellence, and eudaimonia. 15 Within that framework,
individuals are understood to make decisions about moral dilemmas on the basis of their natural
intuitions, which arise from the type of persons they are. There is a reciprocal relationship
between virtue and character. If one acts in virtuous ways, one is understood to have a good
character. Likewise, those with good character are expected to act in virtuous ways. As a result,
one facet of virtue ethics is the notion of a "paradigmatic character," a moral exemplar to whom
individuals might look for examples of good actions. 16
Socrates is considered one of the original proponents of virtue ethics, though there are
significant differences between ancient and modern conceptions of virtue ethics. 17 This is not to
imply that the ancient virtue theorists held one distinct position; though they shared a general
"framework" the theoretical details differed as much among the ancients as they do among
contemporary theorists. 18 In the Socratic dialogues, we see Socrates not only striving to
understand the nature of virtues but also pushing his fellow citizens to do the same, on the

13

This article is widely credited with the contemporary revival of virtue ethics. Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics";
Statman, 3.
14
Anscombe, and Richard Taylor following her, argue that by definition the morally right is required, and the
morally wrong is forbidden, as if by law. However, the notion of moral law as passed down from the divine is a
remnant of earlier, religious-based, forms of ethics. When it is removed, there is no reference or origin for the
required or forbidden, and no grounds for understanding moral right and wrong.
15
While eudaimonia is typically translated as "happiness," most commentators agree that "happiness" doesn't
sufficiently express the meaning of the term. The terms "human flourishing" and "the good life" are commonly put
forth as more accurately reflecting the true meaning of eudaimonia.
16
Statman, 10. Statman points out that while individuals are admirable because they have virtuous traits, it is not
the case that traits are virtuous because certain individuals have them.
17
Crisp, 3; Devettere, 4-5.
18
Prior, 2; Devettere 151-154; Rowe 9-15.
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premise that doing so will allow them to live the best possible lives. The very purpose of the
Socratic method was "to discover the nature of virtue." 19 Socrates' strategy of examining
individuals on fundamental moral questions – the nature of justice, courage, piety, and the soul,
for instance – was directed toward discerning what makes one a person of good character, and
how one may live the best possible life.
Although I identify Socrates as a virtue ethicist, it is not clear that he himself would have
accepted the label. 20 The value of virtues was unquestioned in Greek life 21 to the point that the
notion of a "virtue ethicist" would have been unintelligible. The concepts that contemporary
authors identify with virtue ethics – the concern with character, virtue, excellence, and being a
good person – were simply a part of Greek philosophical life. 22 However, there is no question
that Socrates self-identified as a philosopher deeply devoted to examining and promoting those
philosophical issues. In the Apology, he tells the jury, "As long as I draw breath and am able, I
shall not cease to practice philosophy" (29d). He goes on to talk about his mission to "exhort"
others to do philosophy, stating that as long as he lives in Athens, he will ask anyone he
encounters, "Are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, and
honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best
possible state of your soul?" (29e).

19

Rowe, 32.
It is possible that Socrates would have been equally unwilling to accept any label. Gomez-Lobo notes that
Socrates' claims of ignorance led to the contradiction that "we attribute to him a decisive influence on the
development of Greek thought, whereas he would perhaps be ready to deny it" (11).
21
Brickhouse and Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates, 123.
22
Taylor, R., Virtue Ethics, 28-32; Brickhouse and Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates, 123.
20
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Socrates' related wisdom to the state of the soul because he claimed that virtue is
knowledge. In the Protagoras, while discussing the nature of virtue, Socrates argues that
"everything is knowledge – justice, temperance, courage," and that virtue is "wholly knowledge."
This argument is made more explicit in the Meno. 23 At 89c-d, Socrates and Meno agree that
all that the soul undertakes and endures, if directed by wisdom, ends in happiness, but if
directed by ignorance, it ends in the opposite.… If then virtue is something in the soul
and it must be beneficial, it must be knowledge, since all the qualities of the soul are in
themselves neither beneficial nor harmful, but accompanied by wisdom or folly they
become harmful or beneficial.

The belief that virtue is knowledge allowed Socrates to argue that as long as one knows the
correct thing to do, one will do it. 24 In this view, it is knowledge that allows us to be virtuous,
and so the pursuit of knowledge is crucial to living a virtuous life. In light of this belief,
Socrates' attempts both to understand fundamental issues and to persuade others to engage in the
same examination are evidence that Socrates aimed for the pursuit of knowledge (and hence
achievement of virtue) for himself and for the people of Athens. In the Apology, Socrates
addresses this directly when he recounts his attempts to persuade the people of Athens "not to
care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and as wise as
possible" (36c).
As was the common thinking at the time, Socrates believed that there were five cardinal
moral virtues. These were courage (andreia), temperance (sōphrosynē), justice (dikaiosynē),

Vlastos classifies the Meno as a transitional dialogue falling between the early and middle periods. (Socrates,
Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 46-47.) I utilize quotes from the Meno here and elsewhere when they serve to
clearly illustrate points made in the early dialogues.
24
Taylor, A. E., 154-156. Taylor points out that Socrates is specifically speaking of moral knowledge, and that
Socrates did not provide a clear explanation for how that knowledge is achieved.
23
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piety (hositēs), and wisdom (sophia). 25 For Socrates, these virtues were connected and
interdependent, a concept referred to as the Unity of the Virtues. As Brickhouse and Smith
explain, "Socrates seems to think that it is conceptually necessary that anyone who has any one
of these virtues will have all of the others." 26 There are two primary theories, the Equivalence
Thesis and the Identity Thesis, which attempt to explain what Socrates meant when he made
claims like that in the Protagoras that wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and piety are "five
names for the same thing" (349bc).
The Equivalence Thesis, first advanced by Vlastos, 27 argues that the virtues exist in a
biconditional relationship, such that one who has any of the virtues must necessarily have all of
them. Each of the virtues enables one to act in the manner of that virtue (e.g., courage enables
courageous action), but Vlastos disagrees that the virtues all refer to the same thing. He writes
that "to homogenize the virtues would be to wipe out those very marks which make up their
distinctive physiognomies and enable us to classify particular actions as instances of this or that
virtue." 28 While he does not believe that all of the virtues are one and the same, he does
maintain that wisdom is a necessary and sufficient condition to have the other virtues.
The Identity Thesis, most influentially promoted by Penner in "The Unity of Virtue," 29
has become the standard view of the Unity of the Virtues. 30 Penner argues that "when Socrates

Brickhouse and Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates, 157. These are the subject of discussion in many of the
dialogues, and Socrates identifies them by name as the five virtues in Protagoras 349b.
26
Brickhouse and Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates, 157.
27
In "The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras."
28
Vlastos, Platonic Studies, 230.
29
Brickhouse and Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates, 182n1.
30
Devereux, 139n4.
25
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said, 'Virtue is one,' he meant it quite literally!" 31 The individual virtues, while distinguishable,
all have as their referent the same thing, "the knowledge of good and evil." 32 Penner explains
that Socrates' question in the Protagoras, "What is courage?" is not meant to be a theoretical
question about the essence of courage, but "rather the general's question," asked in order to
determine how to improve his soldiers and make them brave. The question is about "the
psychological state which makes men brave," which Penner argues is the same psychological
state which makes one wise, just, temperate, and pious. 33 That psychological state is having the
possession of knowledge of good and evil. Although we understand how each virtue is a part of,
or an expression of, moral knowledge, whenever one is speaking of any of the virtues, one is in
fact speaking of moral knowledge, and whenever one can be said to be acting from a virtue, one
is in fact acting from moral knowledge.
The fundamental principle on which Socrates' belief in virtue rests is that of
Eudaimonism. Vlastos credits Socrates as being "the first to establish the eudaemonist
foundation of ethical theory," as well as the first to express a non-instrumentalist version of
eudaimonism, 34 which was adopted by almost all of the Greek moral philosophers who came
after him. 35 Simply stated, eudaimonism is the principle that the ultimate end of all of our actions

31

Penner, 83
Penner, 98.
33
Penner, 86.
34
This position is derived from Socrates' view, discussed below, that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Vlastos' full
account of the "Eudaemonist Axiom" can be found in Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 200-232.
35
Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 10. This non-instrumental form of eudaimonism was "held in
common by Platonists, Aristotelians, Cynics, and Stoics, i.e. all of Greek moral philosophers except the Epicureans."
32
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is happiness. 36 Brickhouse and Smith express this as "Happiness is everyone's ultimate goal, and
anything that is good is good only insofar as it contributes to this goal." 37
There are several theories that attempt to explain Socrates' view on the relationship of
virtue to happiness. These include Irwin's view that virtue is purely instrumental in the pursuit of
happiness, the view of Brickhouse and Smith that the cause of happiness is right action (which is
a product of virtue), and Vlastos' view of the Sovereignty of Virtue.
Irwin describes Socrates' position such that "we all want happiness, and virtue produces
what contributes to happiness." 38 In an effort to discern in what way virtue contributes to
happiness, he offers two versions of this position, which he calls technical and non-technical
conceptions of virtue. The technical conception of virtue is that "happiness is a determinate end
to which virtue prescribes instrumental means . . . or components already chosen under another
description." 39 According to this conception, happiness is an identifiable thing 40 and virtue is an
integral part of reaching that thing. The nontechnical conception is that "happiness is an
indeterminate end for which virtue prescribes components not already chosen under another
description," 41 which means that we do not necessarily know what happiness is nor do we know
how to achieve it. Irwin ultimately argues that the texts do not support happiness as an

36

As noted about (see note 9), it would perhaps be more correct to say that the ultimate end of all our actions is a
good life. However, I will continue to use "happiness" as the translation for eudaimonia because that is the word
used by all the commentators referenced below.
37
Brickhouse and Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates, 128.
38
Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 82.
39
Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 84.
40
Irwin clarifies the difference between a determinate and indeterminate end. If two people are pursuing an end x,
for a determinate end x, "they agree on the components of x, and on examples of achieving x." For an indeterminate
end x, "they both call the end they pursue 'x', and agree on some of its properties, but not far enough to specify the
same components, or to agree on examples of achieving x." Plato's Moral Theory, 83.
41
Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 84.

12

indeterminate end, because if that were the case there would be no way to know whether virtue
was prescribing the right components to achieve that end. 42 He also concludes that because
virtue is an "instrumental means," it is "entirely distinct" from the end of happiness. 43 In Irwin's
view, Socrates "cannot value virtue for itself, but only as an instrumental means to the final
good." 44 The other implication of concluding that happiness is a determinate end is that, under
this view, everyone shares an identical version of happiness or a good life, regardless of the
differences in the individual. As Vlastos points out, this would mean that all people, "the noblest
and the most depraved, have the same 'determinate' final end; they differ only in their choice of
means." 45 I am unable to accept Irwin's view. While I understand his reasoning, Socrates'
continual emphasis on wisdom, justice, and virtue is not compatible with the idea that virtue has
no value in itself. This is made clear in the Apology, when Socrates states that he has neglected
his own affairs over the years, allowing him to spend his time "approaching each one of you like
a father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue" (31b). In fact, virtue is so
important that "it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day," and Socrates will
not stop doing so, even if it means his death (Ap. 38a).
While Irwin argues that virtue is necessary for happiness, Brickhouse and Smith contest
the idea that virtue is necessary or sufficient for happiness. They present the distinction between
necessary and sufficient goods. A thing is a necessary good "if and only if there can be no
happiness without it," while a thing is a sufficient good "if and only if its possession alone

Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 84.
Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 300n53. Irwin defines an "instrumental means" as one that "depends on its causal
properties for its value, and the end it contributes to is entirely district from it."
44
Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 92.
45
Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 8.
42
43
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ensures happiness." 46 For Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates could not believe virtue to be
necessary for happiness without also believing that no one is ever happy. As they explain,
Socrates "thinks that virtue is a kind of moral wisdom. But we have also seen that he thinks that
neither he nor anyone he has ever encountered has actually attained this wisdom." 47 Because
they do not believe that Socrates held the view that no one is ever happy, they reject the
necessity of virtue. They also reject the idea that virtue could be sufficient for happiness,
because it does not account for the fact that harm can and does come to the virtuous person. 48
Brickhouse and Smith offer Priam from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (1100b33-1101a13) as
an example of a virtuous person suffering from misfortunes. Another could be the biblical Job,
whose virtue and misery are both clear throughout the story. If virtue alone ensured happiness,
then these cases would not be possible. 49
In place of virtue being part of happiness, Brickhouse and Smith argue that a good person
engages in good action, and it is good action that makes one "blessed and happy." 50 It is good
action, especially good action guided by virtue, which is necessary and sufficient for happiness.51
Vlastos criticizes this theory as "textually groundless," as a distinction between virtue and
virtuous action "has no foundation in our Socratic texts: such a distinction is never mentioned in
any of Plato's earlier dialogues nor could it be expressed in their vocabulary." 52 I follow Vlastos
in this, and have an additional reason for discounting Brickhouse and Smith's argument. In order

Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, 103.
Brickhouse and Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates, 147.
48
Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, 112.
49
Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, 112.
50
Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, 114.
51
Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, 135.
52
Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 223 n103.
46
47
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to support their argument they are required to dismiss the cases in the text where Socrates'
expresses virtue as necessary or sufficient. A clear example of this revolves around a statement
in the Apology. Socrates states, "No evil comes to a good person either in life or death" (41d).
This is generally accepted to express that virtue alone is sufficient for eudaimonia, and external
factors do not interfere with that. 53 Brickhouse and Smith argue that if Socrates truly does not
know what happens after death (as he claims in Apology 40c-e), he cannot claim that no evil
comes to a good person in death without being hypocritical. 54
Vlastos also examines whether virtue is necessary or sufficient for happiness.

He

discusses two possible ways of understanding Socrates' statement at 48b in the Crito, which he
translates as "to live well is the same as to live honorably and justly." 55 He calls these the
Identity Thesis 56 and the Sufficiency Thesis. He ultimately rejects the Identity Thesis, which
states that "virtue is the only component of happiness, the only good," 57 on the grounds that it
offers no explanation for why non-moral goods contribute to happiness. He instead proposes the
Sufficiency Thesis, in which virtue is sufficient for happiness, but also allows for non-moral
goods (which Vlastos calls "mini-goods") to contribute to happiness. In this view, virtue is a
component of happiness, the sovereign component, but not the only component.
Regardless of which theory we accept, it remains uncontested that, for Socrates, one
cannot have happiness without virtue, and the greatest virtue will lead to the greatest happiness.

Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, 120.
Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, 120.
55
Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 214.
56
This thesis is entirely separate from the thesis of the same name discussed above in relation to the Unity of the
Virtues.
57
Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 217 n65.
53
54
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If one accepts this belief, one will always do what one believes to be the right or virtuous action.
Doing otherwise would lead away from happiness, and so would harm the individual and his or
her pursuit of the ultimate goal. Socrates believes that because people cannot knowingly take
action that would reduce their potential for happiness,58 our actions are always based on what we
believe will be best for us. Those who engage in actions that are not virtuous do so because they
fail to understand that engaging in those actions are actually harming them. As Brickhouse and
Smith explain, "thieves know that they are stealing… [but] do not see that they are also harming
themselves, something they would never do if they understood that fact." 59 Socrates states this
explicitly in the Meno, in an exchange with Meno on whether "anyone, knowing that bad things
are bad nevertheless desires them" (77c):
SOCRATES: Well then, those who you say desire bad things, believing that bad
things harm their possessor, know that they will be harmed by them? – Necessarily.
SOCRATES: And do they not think that those who are harmed are miserable to the
extent that they are harmed? – That too is inevitable.
SOCRATES: And that those who are miserable are unhappy? – I think so.
SOCRATES: Does anyone wish to be miserable and unhappy? - I do not think so,
Socrates.
SOCRATES: No one then wants what is bad, Meno, unless he wants to be such.
For what else is being miserable but to desire bad things and secure them? (77e-78a)

Tied to the pursuit of knowledge and virtue is Socrates' conception of the soul.
According to Rowe, for Socrates, "happiness lies in caring for one's soul, and caring for one's
soul involves simply living virtuously." 60 This explanation, while straightforward, is a simplistic
one that does not express the complexities of Socrates' philosophies. A. E. Taylor's account
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more clearly conveys the role of the virtues in the soul. 61 He clarifies Socrates' position that
attempting to promote excellence in one's soul requires "the cultivation of rational thinking and
rational conduct." 62 In this view, all virtues can and must be acquired through rational thinking.
It is therefore the intellectual virtues that contribute to the excellence of the soul. 63
Using Socrates' pursuit of knowledge through his method of elenchus 64 and his concept
of the soul, we are able to create a picture of his virtue ethics. In order to be virtuous, one must
have good character, moral knowledge, and take virtuous actions. In order to have good
character, one must have a well-developed soul. In order to have a well-developed soul, one
must be able to rationally examine the world and overcome our instincts and desires. In order to
overcome our instincts and desires, one must cultivate logical thinking. Because Socrates
promoted rational thinking in slaves and citizens, young and old, he seems to have believed that
virtue is attainable by anyone willing to examine their positions. 65
Although there has been a great deal of writing on Socrates and the virtues, the
scholarship addressing the role of virtue in the Crito specifically is comparatively limited. The
common interpretation of the Crito applies the Unity of the Virtues and the Principle of
Eudaimonism to Socrates' statements at 49b-e, including "one must never do wrong," and "one
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should never do wrong in return, nor injure any man." In this interpretation, doing wrong,
causing harm, and causing injury are all instances of non-virtuous action. As Vlastos points out,
when Socrates says at 49a, "…to do a wrong is never either good or noble," the Greek word used
for "noble" (kalon) is "normally used to express what is morally right as such." 66 Thus what
Socrates is claiming is that one must always act according to virtue. 67 This is not simply because
it is theoretically the correct thing to do but also because, through the Principle of Eudaimonism,
if Socrates does the morally wrong thing it would be antithetical to the ultimate goal of
happiness. 68 As 49 is the basis of the three primary arguments that follow (the arguments from
injury, agreement, and piety, to be discussed below), the conclusion is that all of the arguments
in the Crito have as their ultimate end the aim of ensuring that Socrates acts according to virtue.
In Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks, Raymond Devettere uses the Crito to
illustrate virtue ethics in practice. He claims that Socrates' primary reason for his actions in the
Crito is that "escaping is immoral because it will not bring him a good life and living well – not
merely living – is the whole point of virtue ethics." 69 He bases this explanation on 47e-48b, 70 in
which Socrates and Crito do in fact agree that "the most important thing is not life, but the good
life" (48b). However, Devettere then ignores the remainder of the text, including the three
primary arguments that are often considered the core of the Crito. These arguments, which Rex
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Martin named the arguments from Injury, Agreement, and Piety, 71 arise later in the dialogue, and
as I will argue in chapter 3, are not representative of virtue ethics. Devettere's disregard of these
arguments cannot be accounted for by the separation thesis (the argument that Socrates did not
necessarily agree with the statements he expressed in the voice of the Laws), 72 as the Argument
from Injury is spoken in Socrates' own voice, and not that of the Laws.
Gerson also attempts to explain Socrates' absolutist statements in the Crito within the
context of a virtue ethics framework. He follows the classic argument that in the Crito, Socrates'
"absolutist prohibition of wrongdoing" is based on the idea that doing wrong harms the soul, but
he offers an alternative understanding of "wrongdoing." Gerson raises the issue that Socrates
frequently asserts in other dialogues that it is impossible for an individual voluntarily to do
wrong. This is clearly stated in the Gorgias when Socrates argues that "no one does what's
unjust because he wants to, but that all who do so do it unwillingly," (509e). 73 However, in the
Crito Socrates prohibits voluntary wrongdoing. Gerson tries to resolve the question: "What is
the point of prohibiting that which is impossible?" 74
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Gerson suggests that when Socrates discusses "voluntary wrongdoing" at 49a, what he
really means by "wrongdoing" is "the abdication or subordination of reason" in pursuit of one's
desires. 75 He argues that what Socrates called impossible is acting against one's own best
interests, but what he prohibits in the Crito is doing what one knows to be objectively wrong,
even if will benefit oneself. In this way, he attempts to differentiate between good action and
action that may appear to benefit the individual on some level, and explains that it is the
subordination of reason that allows one to convince oneself that doing what is wrong can be right
for the individual.76 As applied to the Crito, this means that if Socrates believes that escaping is
wrong, "for him still to try to escape could only mean that he has subordinated his self or rational
soul to his bodily desires." 77
I am unable to accept Gerson's explanation for two reasons. Gerson sets up a false
dichotomy when he contrasts doing right (or, not voluntarily doing wrong) with acting in one's
own best interests. Gerson believes what is prohibited in the Crito is "doing what is in fact
wrong and known to be so by the agent, but which is, from his point of view, in his own
interests." 78 Socrates would not have accepted that there can be a difference between the two.
According to the principle of eudaimonism, if one knows that something is wrong, then one also
knows that doing it cannot be in one's best interests, because acting in a way that is not virtuous
will interfere with the ultimate goal of happiness. No matter what the other benefit may be, it
can never outweigh the pursuit of happiness. In addition, for Socrates there would be little or no
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temptation to take an action that is not virtuous but provides physical or material benefits. As
Irwin notes, in Socrates' view a virtuous person would be expected to "not only choose a virtuous
course of action but also to choose it without regret or reluctance." 79
In the Crito, Socrates does choose the virtuous course of action (or at least what he
believes to be the virtuous course) without regret or reluctance. In that way, Socrates is actively
living out the philosophy he spent his life trying to persuade others to follow, as he did when he
questioned his countrymen, hoping to inspire them to rational thought and to valuing the moral
good above material goods. Socrates lived in pursuit of the virtues, and the language of the
dialogues generally reflects this. However, as I will argue, the Crito is noticeably different in
that Socrates talks far more about moral rules than he does about virtue. In the chapter that
follows, I will discuss rule-based moral theory, specifically deontology. I will review two very
different types of deontology and attempt to apply them to Socrates in the Crito.
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CHAPTER 2: KANTIAN AND ROSSIAN DEONTOLOGY IN THE CRITO

According to Gomez-Lobo, "in the privacy of his cell, Socrates can remind Crito of past
conversations and resulting agreements. He can gently inquire whether Crito wants to revise
them or not." 80 He cannot do so during his trial, and this, Gomez-Lobo says, is what accounts
for the "dogmatic tone" Socrates adopts during the Apology. 81 If Gomez-Lobo is correct, then
we would expect Socrates' arguments and tone in the Crito to be less dogmatic than in the
Apology. Instead, in the Crito we encounter Socrates presenting absolutist statements, on his
own behalf and on behalf of the laws. Far from reflecting a virtue ethics perspective, these
statements instead portray a Socrates whose views are far better explained by deontological
theory. 82
Unlike virtue ethics, deontology centers on the duty to follow moral principles as the
basis for action. While virtue ethicists do not distinguish between the right and the good,
deontologists always give precedence to the right. Although the different deontological theories
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give different weights to the good, they all establish the right as a binding duty. Some
deontologists believe that there is no clear relationship between the right and the good. 83
For deontologists, the first step in engaging in right action is restraining from doing those
things that are known to be wrong. The wrongness of actions is not determined on the basis of
the potential consequence of those actions. Different theories of deontology provide different
means for determining what makes something wrong. These include relying on moral intuition,
or on a rule or fundamental principle. 84
The best known version of deontology is Kant's ethical theory, which has come to
epitomize what we now call rule deontology. For rule deontologists, the "standards of right and
wrong consist of one or more rules" 85 that allow us to determine the right action in any given
circumstance. These rules are valid regardless of the probable outcome(s) of following them. It
is a basic tenet of deontology that moral values are not, and cannot, be determined by the
possible consequences of the agent's action.
In Kant's ethics, there is one foundational rule that determines our moral duty in every
circumstance. Kant introduces this rule, called the Categorical Imperative, in the Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals. As Korsgaard notes, in the Groundwork Kant presents several
concepts that have become entrenched in our understanding of ethical theory and morality:
Some of its central themes – that every human being is an end in himself or herself, not to
be used as a mere means by others; that respect for one's own humanity finds its fullest
expression in respect for that of others; and that morality is freedom, and evil a form of
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enslavement – have become not only well-established themes in moral philosophy, but
also part of our moral culture. 86
Kant believed that the categorical imperative offered the "necessary and sufficient criterion for
determining what more concrete maxims or rules we should live by." 87
Kant viewed the categorical imperative as a law in the same way that rules of
mathematics are law. He believed it to be an immutable fact, and although one may deny it in
the same way that one might deny that 2 + 2 = 4, it does not cease to be true. 88 Kant specifies
that "the categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as objectively
necessary of itself, without reference to another end" (Gr. 4:414). As a law, it is unconditional
and universal, not depending on external conditions in order to be true. 89 Like the basis of
mathematical laws, Kant tried to discover "a foundation for morality in reason alone." 90 Because
"no experience could give occasion to infer even the possibility" 91 of universal law, the
categorical imperative must be based purely on rational thought, without any appeal to emotion
or experience (Gr. 4:408). Kant argues that "all moral concepts have their seat and origin
completely a priori in reason" (Gr. 4:411), and as a result, one is moral if and only if one is
rational. 92 It is rationality that allows us to apply the categorical imperative in order to identify
and understand our duties.
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Kant presents four ways of formulating the categorical imperative, all of which he claims
express the same idea. The Formula of Universal Law reads: "Act only on that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." 93 This formulation
requires us to ask whether a maxim could coherently hold true if it was universalized. 94 If
universalization would "annul the maxim" or interfere with its ability to be applied, then we
cannot accept or act on it. 95 The use of the word "will" in this formulation is critical. Kant
defines the will as "a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination
cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good" (Gr. 4:412) and argues that
We must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law: this is the
canon of moral appraisal of action in general. Some actions are so constituted that their
maxim cannot even be thought without contradiction as a universal law of nature, far less
could one will that it should become such. In the case of others that inner impossibility is
indeed not to be found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim be raised to the
universality of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself. (Gr. 4:424)

Because one must "will" that a maxim become law, a maxim must be evaluated not only for its
feasibility and logical coherence, but also for whether or not it would serve the best aims of a
rational individual if the maxim were to become universal law. Kant believes that "the moral
law holds for every rational agent," and when a law is universalized, all agents must act
according to it. 96 The laws cannot be applied differently on the basis of circumstances or
preferences.
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The Formula of the End in Itself 97 states: "So act as to use humanity, both in your own
person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a
means." This is based on Kant's assertion that "rational nature exists as an end in itself" (Gr.
4:429). All rational beings, therefore, must be respected as worthwhile for their own sakes, and
never only for what they can do for others. Objects and "beings without reason" only have a
"relative worth, as means," while human beings have an "absolute worth" which exists
independently of all other factors (Gr. 4:428). In addition to all rational beings existing as ends in
themselves, humanity as a whole exists as an end in itself (Gr. 4:430). Humanity can only
function as an end in itself if "everyone tries, as far as he can, to further the ends of others. For
the ends of a subject who is an end in itself must as far as possible be also my ends, if that
representation is to have its full effect in me" (Gr. 4:430). Therefore, to act in accordance with
this formulation, one must "treat others as embodiments of the moral law, themselves able to
formulate and follow the categorical imperative." 98 To treat individuals solely as a means is to
deny them the right and ability to make informed, reasoned choices. 99
The Formula of Autonomy states: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same
time as making universal law through its maxim." As Kant explains, "the will is not merely
subject to the law but subject to in such a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to
itself" (Gr. 4:431). It is not simply that the law must be followed; the law must be followed
because it is the will that creates it. 100 Despite their apparent similarities, this formulation differs
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in important ways from the Formula of Universal Law. Paton points out that one can be forced
to act in accordance with certain maxims, as is required by the Formula of Universal Law.
However, one can never be forced to have a specific end in mind when acting. One follows the
Formula of Autonomy out of free will. 101 In addition, this formulation makes it explicit that the
categorical imperative is free of external conditions and interests. Kant argues that when the will
legislates universal law, "only then is the practical principle, and the imperative that the will
obeys, unconditional, since it can have no interest as its basis" (Gr. 4:432). As Paton explains,
"to say that a moral will is autonomous, that it makes its own law, is to say that it is not
determined by any interest." 102
The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends reads: "So act as if you were always through your
maxims a law-making member in a universal kingdom of ends." The kingdom of ends 103 would
come into existence if maxims prescribed by the categorical imperative were universally
followed. 104 This principle demands that we both follow all maxims prescribed by the
categorical imperative and only create maxims that are in accordance with the categorical
imperative. To be a law-making member of the kingdom of ends, the laws one creates must not
be influenced by our personal desires or ends. "The kingdom of ends is concerned with private
ends only so far as they are compatible with universal law." 105
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In his accounting of the Formulae of Universal Law and the Kingdom of Ends, Kant
discusses (although he never precisely defines) perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are
specifically required or prohibited by the categorical imperative, while imperfect duties are
required to further certain goals. 106 A perfect duty forbids or requires us to perform a specific act
and "admits no exception in favor of inclination," (Gr. 4:421n). An imperfect duty requires that
we follow a general maxim, and although Kant does not explicitly say so, his examples allow us
to assume that imperfect duties can be influenced by desires. 107 Kant offers as examples of
perfect duties that one is forbidden from committing murder (of oneself or others), lying, and
other acts that treat agents solely as means; imperfect duties require us to develop our talents,
treat others with kindness and compassion, and in all ways treat others as ends in themselves. 108
When trying to determine right action, perfect duties take precedence over imperfect ones. 109
However, in the absence of duties, we are free to pursue our own ends and our own happiness.
As Paton explains, "where actions are not prohibited, we have every right to go forward as we
please in accordance with our inclinations." 110
Kant's ethics do not allow for exceptions for any reason. One cannot do a wrong even if
the consequence will lead to more good. In practice, a strict interpretation of Kant's ethics means
that one cannot tell a lie even if it will save five (or ten, or one hundred) innocent lives. This is a
situation that some deontologists found untenable, and sought to resolve.
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Among them is W. D. Ross, who offers a version of rule deontology that is based on the
Intuitionist belief that we have an innate understanding of what are right and wrong actions. Ross
argued that "Kant's basic principle is incoherent." 111 His interpretation of Kant is that we are
required to act from a motive of duty. Ross contends that we do not determine our own motives,
so it is incoherent to require that we act from a specific motive. 112 Ross rejects the notion of a
single understanding of right and wrong, and instead proposes that there are many principles
which we instinctively 113 recognize as being morally right. 114 Ross offers keeping a promise and
relieving distress as examples of things that one does "because he thinks he ought to," 115 without
considering the consequences. We follow these principles because we know without thinking
about it that they are the right things to do. 116 Because we know that the principles must be
followed, we have a duty to follow them, and so it can be said that we have a duty to keep
promises and a duty to relieve distress.
Ross identifies two kinds of duties, prima facie duties and actual duties. Prima facie
duties are those for which we have "a kind of moral reason for action." 117 They are the duties that
we intuitively imbue with a moral weight and recognize as things that "ought to be done." 118
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Ross identifies seven categories of prima facie duties, 119 although he notes that it is not a
complete or final list. These are:
1) Duties of fidelity, which include keeping a promise or implicit promise.
2) Duties of reparation, which arise from one's own prior wrongdoings and may involve
trying to right these wrongs or offer reparations for them.
3) Duties of gratitude, which are based on the past service of others. Ross clarifies that
the term gratitude refers to "the returning of services, irrespective of motive." 120
4) Duties of justice, which involve ensuring that "pleasure or happiness" (and the means
to acquire them) are fairly and impartially distributed.
5) Duties of beneficence, which involve making others' lives better.
6) Duties of self-improvement, which arise from the ability to make oneself more
knowledgeable or virtuous.
7) Duties of non-maleficence, which involve not harming others. Ross notes that the
duties of maleficence are distinct from those of beneficence, and come into play prior
to beneficence. 121
Ross emphasizes that these are duties of action, not duties of motive. "It is not our duty
to have certain motives, but to do certain acts." 122 Although in some cases we may be motivated
to fulfill a duty, at other times we may fulfill the duty in spite of our driving forces. It may be
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easier not to fulfill a promise or offer an apology or return borrowed funds, but we still recognize
that we need to do so, and know that we have violated moral principles if we do not.
Although the focus of Ross' theory is duties, he does provide a basis for moral principles.
However, in direct contrast to Kant, moral principles are not developed from reason but through
experience. We can generalize moral principles from our prima facie duties in specific
situations. For example, my intuition might dictate that I return the twenty dollars my friend just
dropped. Using intuitive induction, I can generalize the moral principle that I should not keep
money that doesn't belong to me. 123
Prima facie duties can and do come into conflict with each other. To use Ross' example,
one may have the duty to keep a promise to meet someone and have that come into conflict with
the duty to help the victims of an accident that they pass on the way to the meeting. 124 Because
there cannot be a general ranking of prima facie duties, deciding among them is "inescapably a
matter for judgement… theory cannot help at all." 125 Although general principles cannot be
used to determine what action an agent should take when prima facie duties come into conflict,
Ross believes that principles are important because they are used to allow for consistency in our
moral decisions. 126
Ross notes that though we are frequently required to choose among our principles, and
that the decisions are not necessarily easy, the fact that the principles come into conflict does not
make them any less valid. If one breaks a promise in order to help an injured person, one still
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feels bad about having broken that promise and still feels the need to fulfill it. In this way,
principles can survive intact when conflicts arise between them. While choosing among
principles is a question of prioritization, the priorities are set for that specific circumstance only.
The agent may make entirely different choices in a different set of conditions. The act of
choosing among the principles does not require abandoning any of them. 127
The outcome of our deliberations about our prima facie duties results in our actual duties
(also called obligatory duties and duties proper.) The actual duty is "what we actually ought to
do in a particular situation," 128 and is the choice that would allow us to meet our prima facie
duties to the greatest possible extent. 129 Ross points out that because every act has far-flung
effects, trivial or significant, it is highly probable that good acts will do some harm and wrong
acts will do some good. "Every act therefore, viewed in some aspects, will be prima facie right,
and viewed in others, prima facie wrong, and right acts can be distinguished from wrong acts
only as being those which, of all those possible for the agent in the circumstances, have the
greatest balance of prima facie rightness…over their prima facie wrongness." 130 As a result of
these calculations, we can never know for certain what our actual duty is. Our moral principles
can never give us complete certainty about how we ought to act in any given situation. While we
may know our prima facie duties, we can at best have a very strong feeling about our actual
duties.
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The most significant difference between Ross and Kant is the nature of a duty or duties
and how we come to know them. For Kant there is one absolute duty which we derive through
pure reason. There is no reason ever to act other than according to that duty, and we have no
doubts about how we ought to act when moral questions arise. For Ross, there are many duties,
and we arrive at them through intuition based on experiences. We often have duties that conflict
with each other, and the individual must decide which duty should take precedence in each
situation. Another significant difference lies in the fact that Ross believes that the same actions
can be judged right or wrong depending on the perspective from which it is viewed. For Kant, it
is impossible (in the same way that humans taking flight unassisted is impossible) for a right
action to ever be anything other than entirely right.
It is not uncommon for those who are not deliberately thinking in terms of virtue ethics to
tend offhandedly to refer to Socrates in the Crito in deontological terms. Frankena, for example,
remarks that Socrates' decision-making process in the Crito "is that of a rule-deontologist, since
he simply appeals to certain rules," 131 and Ross offers Socrates in the Crito as an example of one
dealing with complex prima facie duties. 132 In his short essay, "Plato on Moral Principles,"
Demos attempts to reconcile Plato's consequentialist statements with his deontological ones. He
concludes that this can be done using the view Plato expresses in Republic II, "that some things
have worth both in themselves, and through their consequences." 133 Though Demos is speaking
of Plato's body of work as a whole, more than half of the examples he uses to illustrate Plato's
deontological leanings are taken from the Crito alone. He cites the Euthyphro: "Wrongdoing
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should always be punished" (8b-d) and two instances that specifically focus on duties: the
obligation of gratitude in the Theaetetus (176b) and the obligation of piety in the Laws (716b).
The remainder of his examples, "we ought not to requite wrong with wrong" (49b), "one must
never do wrong" (49b), "It is wrong whenever we suffer evil to inflict evil in return" (49d), and
"It is wrong to break agreements and contracts when they are just and have been undertaken
without compulsion or fraud" (49e) are taken from the Crito.
Socrates' statements in the Crito reflect a mixture of Kant's ethics and Ross' theory of
prima facie duties. Socrates' typical reliance on virtue ethics would likely have made him
uncomfortable accepting Kant's form of deontology, as it does not allow for re-evaluating an
action on the basis of circumstances. In the Crito, Socrates expresses a clear willingness to do
so. He says, "I value and respect the same principles as before, and if we have no better
arguments to bring up at the moment, be sure that I shall not agree with you" (46c). Kant would
not even contemplate that the principles could have reason to change. The reevaluation of one's
principles based on the circumstance is a familiar concept in Ross' theory and, with few
exceptions, it is Ross' theory that offers a deontological approach that can be applied to Socrates'
statements in the Crito, as I argue below.
Socrates' discusses several rules throughout the dialogue that are phrased so as to be
immutable and absolute. These include never willingly doing wrong (49b), never engaging in
retaliation (49b), keeping one's agreements (49e), and honoring one's country (51a-b). These
statements are similar in form and function to Ross' moral principles, and due to the nature of the
elenchus, they are developed in similar ways. Ross' moral principles are developed through
experience. One encounters a situation that requires a moral decision and makes that decision
through intuition and reason. As one encounters similar moral quandaries and continues to
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resolve them in the same way, a moral principle develops. This principle can then be applied to
other moral problems that share the same characteristics. Similarly, when Socrates engages
people in dialogue in order to determine the right action, he generalizes from specific examples.
One example of this is in the Crito at 47b-e. Socrates asks, "Should a man professionally
engaged in physical training pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of any man, or to
those of one man only, namely a doctor or trainer?" When Crito agrees that it is the opinion of
the one that matters in that case, Socrates next asks, "He should therefore fear the blame and
welcome the praise of that one man, and not those of the many?" This exchange continues until
Socrates finally asks, "So with other matters, not to enumerate them all… should we follow the
opinion of the many…or that of the one…?" Like Ross, Socrates' practice is to generalize a
guiding principle from specific instances.
Socrates' application of these principles is consistent with Ross' view. He believes that he
must obey the laws, but in the Apology he gives examples of times when he did not do so. When
Socrates' refused the order to bring Leon from Salamis (Ap. 32d), he had resolved the conflicting
principles of obeying the laws and not doing wrong. Although he chose to give primacy to not
doing wrong, it did not lessen his duty to obey the law. Socrates' decision to give precedence to
not doing wrong is one way in which Socrates' statements are more reflective of Kantian
deontology, for in both the Apology and the Crito he makes statements to the extent that avoiding
wrongdoing is more important that anything else. In the Apology, he says his actions showed
that "death is something I couldn't care less about, but that my whole concern is not to do
anything unjust or impious" (32d). Similarly, in the Crito he says, "If it appears that we shall be
acting unjustly, then we have no need at all to take into account whether we shall have to die if
we stay here and keep quiet, or suffer in another way, rather than do wrong" (48d).
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Vlastos argues that Socrates' prohibition against wrongdoing is based on the notion that
doing wrong harms the soul. 134 Kant would categorize this as a conditional imperative, one that
is dependent upon external factors in order to be true. As a conditional imperative, it would take
the form, "If doing X harms the soul, then we should not do X." As a result, the prohibition
against wrongdoing ceases to be a relevant principle, except as one of the many means to
preserve or harm the soul. The force and repetition of Socrates' prohibition against wrongdoing
does not allow for that principle to be irrelevant or incidental, as it would be if Vlastos was
correct. Instead, we see the prohibition against wrongdoing as a duty that is not based on any
external factors.
Farrell also applies deontological principles to the Crito. He examines the results of
analyzing the Crito through a Kantian lens when he attempts to frame Socrates' arguments as
universal maxims. It is his aim to develop a maxim that would "apply to [Socrates'] predicament
in the Crito and justify escape, on the one hand, but would not portend grave injury or civil
discord if it were accepted and acted on by people generally, on the other." 135 Farrell is
ultimately unable to do so, because such a maxim would require Socrates to agree that (1) in
receiving unjust punishment, the harm done to him is greater than the harm to the state, and (2)
that the state would suffer minimal harm if everyone wrongly found guilty tried to evade
punishment. Farrell concludes that Socrates would never agree to such a maxim.
Socrates would have likely supported Farrell's conclusion, as his argument on this very
topic is based on the dangers of universalization (Cr. 50a-b). Socrates, in the voice of the Laws,
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is arguing that escaping from prison would be an attempt to destroy the laws. Although the issue
at hand is Socrates' escape, he asks, "Do you think it possible for a city not to be destroyed if the
verdicts of its courts have no force but are nullified and set as naught by private individuals?"
(Cr. 50b). It is clear that, like Kant's categorical imperative demands, he would only act if he
could will the action to become universal law.
As I argue above, Socrates' position in the Crito is consistent with deontological theory,
both Kantian and Rossian. In the chapter that follows, I will conduct a careful examination of
Socrates' three primary arguments in the Crito in order to fully develop this argument.
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CHAPTER 3: SOCRATES' DEONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

Traditional (Kantian) deontology and virtue ethics appear to provide diametrical methods
for determining the correct action when faced with a moral dilemma. In what follows, I will be
examining three of the primary arguments in the Crito, specifically focusing on their ethical
underpinnings. I will argue that Socrates' arguments rest on deontological principles, and
without them his arguments would fail.
Three of Socrates' primary arguments in the Crito are the arguments from Injury,
Agreement, and Piety. 136 These arguments are offered by Socrates, giving voice to what he
postulates would be the arguments of the laws of Athens. He asks Crito to imagine a scenario in
which, as they attempted to escape, "the laws and the state came and confronted us" (50a). He
then articulates those arguments as part of his discussion with Crito. As Martin explains, these
arguments are "developed in an imaginary dialogue between the personified Laws of Athens and
Socrates." 137As discussed in chapter 2, I assume that the views of the Laws are Socrates' own
views.
The Argument from Injury begins after Socrates and Crito have agreed that "one should
never do wrong in return, nor injure any man, whatever injury one has suffered at his hands" 138

Rex Martin explains that, of all the arguments in the Crito, these "bear directly on the justice of obeying the law"
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(49cd). Socrates then asks if defying his verdict would lead him to "injuring people whom we
should least injure" (50a). Crito's reply, "I cannot answer your question, Socrates. I do not
know," suggests that he cannot agree, either because he does not know whether this is true or
because he does not understand the question. 139 In elaborating, Socrates comes to the heart of
the Argument from Injury: In the voice of the Laws, he asks, "Do you not by this action you are
attempting intend to destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you are concerned?
Or do you think it possible for a city not to be destroyed if the verdicts of the courts have no
force but are nullified and set at naught by private individuals?" (50a).
Socrates' argument here is as follows: If people can set aside the verdicts of the courts at
will, then the verdicts of the courts, and the courts themselves, have no force. If the courts have
no force, then the laws have no force, because without the enforcement of the courts the laws are
powerless. If the laws are powerless, they have lost all purpose and function and are effectively
destroyed. If the laws are destroyed, then the city will be destroyed. Therefore, setting aside the
verdicts of the courts is an attempt to destroy the laws and the city.
If this argument were to focus solely on Socrates' actions as an individual, it would hold
very little weight. One person defying a verdict and avoiding punishment cannot cause the
destruction of the state. If that were the case, Crito and his compatriots would not have been

account the risk of life or death; he should look to this only in his actions, whether what he does is right or wrong,
whether he is acting like a good or bad man" (28bc). There are dangers to doing wrong and becoming a bad man,
Socrates argues, because "the wicked do some harm to those who are closest to them" (25c), and "if I make one of
my one of my associates wicked I run the risk of being harmed by him" (25c).
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anxious to help Socrates avoid punishment, nor would they believe that failing to do so would
harm their reputations (44d-46a). Many of those involved in the plot, including Crito, are friends
of Socrates. Crito mentions these friendships in the dialogue, and Socrates not only does not
dispute the nature of these relationships, but he in turn addresses Crito as "my dear friend" (54d).
As Socrates argues in the Apology, people benefit from friendships 140 with good people and are
harmed by such with wicked people, and no one "would rather be harmed than benefited by his
associates" (25d). This leads to the conclusion that Socrates would consider his friends,
including those involved in the plan for him to escape, to be good people and good citizens. If
we take at face value Socrates' argument that defying the verdict would bring about the
destruction of the city, it is nonsensical to believe that his friends would knowingly participate in
bringing about the downfall of the city. It is when Socrates universalizes his argument that it
becomes plausible. We can easily see how, if everyone ignored the verdicts of the courts, they
would become useless. If the courts are useless at enforcing the laws and punishing those who
break them, one result could be the destruction of "the laws, and indeed the whole city" (50ab).
Socrates does not explain how or why he moves from talking about one individual to all
individuals, but the general principle he seems to be following is, "What if everybody did what I
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do?" Here, Socrates is acting according to the principles that would come to be named by Kant
the Formulae of Autonomy and Universal Law. 141 If he did not do so, this argument would fail.
Allen argues that the type of universalization utilized by Socrates is significantly different
from the categorical imperative. "Universalization is not offered as an independent test of right
and wrong, but as a principle attaching to legal validity. Breach of this verdict is destructive to
all law precisely because this verdict issued from a source legally empowered to render it." 142
However, Socrates is very clear that he is discussing the danger to a city of disregarding "the
verdicts of its courts" (50b). There is nothing in the text, implicitly or explicitly, to suggest that
Socrates is speaking only of his own case. It is also the case that any verdict issued by a court is
"legally empowered to render it." If a verdict came from some other agency, defying it would
threaten the power of that agency and could similarly be said to be an attempt to destroy it.
The Argument from Piety presupposes that the relationship of a citizen to the city is
analogous to that of a child to her parents or a servant to his master, as the city is responsible for
nurturing and educating the citizens. The city also claims responsibility for the citizens’ very
existence, asking, "was it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you?"
(50d-e). Once that relationship is established, the Laws assert that there is a fundamental power
difference between parents and children, or masters and servants. These relationships are not
"on an equal footing" (50e), and so it is not permissible or acceptable for a child to treat his
parents in the same manner that the parents treat the child. For example, a child does not have

141

I recognize that if Socrates was truly acting according to either formulae his question would not be, "What if
everyone did this?" but instead "Can I universalize this even if not everyone does it?" However, I am not attempting
to argue that Socrates exhibited a prescient knowledge of Kant or Ross. Instead, my argument is that Socrates relies
on a deontological framework that is in many ways very similar to the theories later introduced by Kant and Ross.
142
Allen, 85.

41

the right to punish a parent for bad behavior. Socrates argues that a child/servant does not have
the right to retaliate in response to the actions of the parent/master. He then goes on to extend
this argument to the state. "Do you think you have this right to retaliation against your country
and its laws? That if we undertake to destroy you and think it right to do so, you can undertake
to destroy us, as far as you can, in return?" (51a). The Laws conclude this argument by stating
that "it is impious to bring violence to bear against your mother or father, it is much more so to
use it against your country" (51c). This builds on the Argument from Injury, and is based on the
idea that defying the court's verdict would be attempting to destroy the state, and thus do
violence against it.
While speaking of the imperative to honor the city, Socrates says, "You must either
persuade it or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it instructs you to endure, whether
blows or bonds, and if it leads you into war to be wounded or killed, you must obey" (51b). As a
guideline for action, this principle is clear, concise, and absolute. It does not allow for an
individual to assess a situation and determine the virtuous action. 143 It compels the individual to
obey, even when doing so would have negative consequences. Like deontology, it is not
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concerned with outcomes or consequences. If Socrates was relying on virtue, he would be
asking questions like, "Would it be good to obey these orders? Are the orders themselves just
and worth obeying? What are the possible outcomes of obeying or disobeying?" 144 In doing so,
he would have to abandon his "persuade or obey" argument. It is only as a deontic principle that
this argument can succeed.
According to virtue ethics, an individual must rationally examine a situation in order to
determine a correct course of action. The arguments from Injury and Piety are not dependent on
the particular circumstances of a situation. They are offered as guidelines for action that can and
should be followed by anyone encountering the same moral questions, regardless of the situation.
The Argument from Piety is built on the Argument from Injury, and the two are meant to work
together. In the Crito, Socrates does not acknowledge the possibility that the prohibition against
causing injury could come into conflict with the mandate to obey the law, but it is not difficult to
imagine a situation in which the result of obeying the law would be causing injury. Indeed, in
the Apology Socrates discusses one such situation, which took place while the Thirty Tyrants
were in power:
When the oligarchy was established, the Thirty summoned me to the Hall, along with
four others, and ordered us to bring Leon from Salamis, that he might be executed. They
gave many such orders to many people, in order to implicate as many as possible in their
guilt…When we left the Hall, the other four went to Salamis and brought in Leon, but I
went home. I might have been put to death for this, had not the government fallen shortly
afterwards. (32c-d)
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Leon was innocent, and even though Socrates' life was at stake and he knew that the actions of
the other four would result in Leon's death anyway, the execution was a wrongdoing to which
Socrates could not be a party.
As I mention in chapter 2, this is one situation in which we see Socrates encounter what
Ross would call conflicting prima facie duties. Socrates must choose between his duty to obey
the law and his duty to avoid causing injury, and in this instance, he determines that his actual
duty is to avoid causing injury. At first glance, it appears that Socrates also faces conflicting
prima facie duties in the Crito. However, if we recall that Ross stipulates that giving precedence
to one duty does not make the others less valid, it becomes clear that the situations are not
parallel. In the Crito, Socrates does not appear to believe that he has any duties at all that might
have the end result of his escape. His choice would be between fulfilling a duty and actively
disregarding it, not giving one duty precedence over another. Because his position is that he has
already fulfilled his duties, and because he was able to fulfill all of them without a conflict, his
only choices would be actively to disobey the law, to injure the state, or to dishonor an
agreement. His other duties would not gain priority as a result.
Like the other arguments, the Argument from Agreement takes the form of a
universalizable maxim. It is grounded in the principle that Socrates and Crito agree on at 49e,
"when one has come to an agreement that is just with someone, one should fulfill it." The
argument is based on the premise that by living in Athens, raising children there and fulfilling
the duties of a citizen, Socrates has implicitly agreed to abide by the laws. By disregarding the
judgments of the courts, the Laws argue, "you are breaking the commitments and agreements
that you made with us without compulsion or deceit, and under no pressure" (52de).
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According to this argument, Socrates could have left Athens and in effect dissolved the
agreement, but since he did not do so, he does not have the right now to break the agreement.
This argument does not allow for breaking the agreement for any reason, no matter how much
the surrounding circumstances change. Within a virtue ethics context, we would expect the
specifics of the situation to be the basis for determining the action taken. As virtue ethics asks us
to look at what a virtuous person would do in the situation, one could argue that Socrates'
position is that a virtuous person should fulfill just agreements. However, a blanket statement
that a virtuous person should always honor just agreements is functionally no different from a
deontological principle that says the same. 145 John Rawls asserts such a principle as an integral
part of his deontological theory of justice. He notes that "when we enter an agreement we must
be able to honor it even should the worst possibilities prove to be the case." 146 Ross would
characterize this as a principle based on the duty of fidelity, the duty to "fulfill promises and
implicit promises because we have made them." 147
R.E. Allen points out an ambiguity in Socrates' assertion about agreements that arises
from the phrase, "when one comes to an agreement that is just with someone" (49e). Allen asks,
"Is it that one must do what he agreed if the agreement is just? Or that one must do what he
agreed if to do so is just?" 148 The former focuses on the context in which the agreement was
made (e.g., one was not coerced into making the agreement) while the latter requires an
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evaluation of the substance of the agreement. We would expect that Socrates' concern would be
establishing whether the substance of the agreement – precisely what it is that is being agreed
upon – is just. While he does offer in full the substance of the agreement, he does not offer any
means for evaluating its justice or validity. In contrast, he provides specific criteria for
evaluating the context of the agreement. 149
The three criteria presented to evaluate the validity of the context of an agreement are:
1) The agreement is made "without compulsion or deceit" (52e).
2) The agreement is made "under no pressure of time for deliberation" (52e).
3) There are alternatives to the agreement. The Laws say, "If we do not please him, he
can take his possessions and go wherever he pleases" (51d).
In the Crito, these criteria are applied to the agreement of the citizens with the city, but because
they are evaluating context and not substance, they can be applied to any agreement. In effect,
Socrates has established a procedural method for evaluating agreements, one that can be applied
universally. 150 In concert with a maxim that states "one must keep arguments if they were
validly formed," it allows anyone in any situation to determine how she ought to act. This is a
purely deontological method of determining the right action. It allows us to determine whether
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we are permitted to break an agreement, but it does so without giving any consideration to the
merit or consequences of the action.
I do not mean to imply that the substance of the agreement is irrelevant; certainly,
Socrates would never have held that stance. Presumably one considers the virtues and possible
outcomes of an agreement when it is formed. 151 In addition, one is not irrevocably bound. If
necessary, agreements can be harmoniously dissolved. In the Crito, Socrates would have done
so by leaving the city (52b-e), but harmonious dissolution could take many forms (e.g., mutual
agreement, providing compensation, or renegotiating terms.)
While Socrates does not provide a basis for evaluating the substance of an agreement,
Kostman offers an example of how such an evaluation might operate. "If one has agreed to do x,
and in certain circumstances doing x involves doing y, and doing y is unjust, then one is not
obligated to do keep one's agreement in those circumstances, but one is still obligated to do x in
other circumstances." 152 In contrast, an evaluation of the context might read, "If one has agreed
to do x, and the agreement complied with procedural justice, one must do x." The former,
requiring examination of the particulars of an agreement, is an approach consistent with virtue
ethics. The latter, providing a rule to follow regardless of other factors, is consistent with
deontological ethics. This is not an exception in the Crito, which provides other rules for action,
including a prohibition against retaliation (49b-d) and a declaration that dying is always
preferable to acting unjustly (48d). While Kostman argues that Socrates' statement refers to
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evaluating the substance of each individual agreement, there is no textual basis for the argument.
Socrates offers three specific means for evaluating context, and none for assessing substance. If
we acknowledge Socrates' deontological position in the Crito, it is easy to resolve this ambiguity
in favor of the context of the agreement.
In addition, it is not clear that the substance of this particular agreement was just.
Socrates should have had the opportunity to attempt to "persuade" the city. Young argues that
at his trial, Socrates addressed the citizens; if by 'city' we mean the citizens of Athens,
then Socrates had a chance to persuade the city… and he failed. Recalling that in the
Crito the laws distinguish themselves from the citizens, we might ask: When did
Socrates have a chance to persuade these laws? The answer seems to be that he never
had such a chance; indeed, it is impossible even to imagine what such a chance would be
like. 153

Socrates does not spend any time in the dialogue discussing whether he had sufficient
opportunity to persuade the city of anything. He simply acknowledges his failure to persuade,
and his subsequent duty to obey. Again, this reflects his position that the outcome of the
agreement is irrelevant; he followed the procedure that would ensure that the outcome was just,
and therefore must adhere to it. I wish to stress that it is not simply that Socrates agreed to abide
by the outcome of the procedure; he agreed that the outcome, whatever it was, would be just
because it came about as a result of following the procedure.
As with Injury and Piety, the Argument from Agreement is dependent upon deontological
principles. Any attempt to introduce virtue into the question of whether an agreement is valid
would require an examination of the substance of the agreement. If an agreement can be
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declared invalid because of its substance, Socrates could not reply to the objection, "The city
wronged me, and its decision was not right," simply by referring back to the validity of the
agreement. Without its deontological base, the Argument from Agreement is not able to provide
a definitive answer.
It is the nature of virtue ethics that the answers it provides are not absolute. They are
based on character, virtue, and an assessment of consequences. Those things will differ
depending on who is applying them, and while we can hope that people have a common
conception of virtue, there can always be differences in moral judgments. Socrates' three
arguments do not allow for such differences. We are instead presented with universalizable
maxims: "One must never do wrong… Nor must one, when wronged, inflict wrong in return"
(49b); "You must either persuade [the city] or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it
instructs you to endure" (51b); "When one has come to an agreement that is just with someone…
one should fulfill it” (49e). Whether Socrates could still convincingly argue against escaping
from prison without relying on deontological principles is a question that remains to be
answered. I believe, however, that I have successfully argued at least that his position did in fact
rely on deontological principles in place of the virtues.
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CONCLUSION

I have argued that in the Crito, Socrates adopts a mode of ethical reasoning that is very
different from what is typical of him. Instead of relying on arguments from virtue – arguments
that would entail asking, "What would the virtuous person do in this very situation?" – Socrates
is instead relying on arguments from duty, arguments that entail asking, "What ought any person
do in this type of situation?"
In chapter 1, I presented an overview of Socrates' conception of virtue and how an
argument from virtue might be formulated. In chapter 2, I discussed two types of deontology
and how the duties they present dictate what actions we must take when faced with a moral
dilemma. In chapter 3, I analyzed Socrates' primary arguments in the Crito and argued that they
rely on a deontological approach to ethics, and if that deontic framework was removed, the
arguments would fail.
Socrates' actions, as portrayed in Plato's writings, have led to his characterization as a
moral exemplar, a man whose "life, behavior, and personality constitute a model for living." 154
He has come down in history as a man of such extraordinary character that he has been classed
with Jesus of Nazareth. A.E. Taylor called Socrates and Jesus the two "historical figures whose
influence on the life of humanity has been profoundest,"155 and Livingstone claimed that
Socrates "has had a deeper influence on western civilization than anyone except Jesus." 156 Karl
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Jaspers identified him as one of "the four paradigmatic individuals [who] have exerted a
historical influence of incomparable scope and depth…They are so far above all others that they
must be singled out if we are to form a clear view of the world's history." 157 This
characterization of Socrates is due to his choice to die before doing what he believed to be
wrong, a decision that has been attributed to his virtuous character. 158 He believed so deeply
against acting wrongly that he refused to do so, even though it cost him his life.
How would this characterization change if we viewed his actions as driven by duty
instead of virtue? When we act from duty, we take an action because we have to, not because we
want to. A man who did the right thing because duty demanded it is not likely to be regarded as
a paragon. He is not going to be held up as an excellent man, or a virtuous man, or a moral
exemplar. 159 I suspect that the historical view of Socrates the dutiful would be quite different
from that of Socrates the virtuous. Werner Jaeger claims that "it was not really his life or his
doctrine (so far as he had any doctrine) which raised him to such eminence, so much as the death
he suffered for the conviction on which his life was founded." 160 If my interpretation of
Socrates' motives and actions in the Crito are correct, we must ask whether Socrates deserves the
reputation that history has granted him. Perhaps more importantly, we must ask whether
Socrates' reputation would still hold if we look at his life alone, without his martyr's death.
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Jaspers, 3. The other three individuals are Jesus, Buddha, and Confucius.
This characterization has not been taken uncritically. In The Reputation of Socrates: The Afterlife of a Gadfly,
James Hulse provides an excellent overview of the historical progression of Socrates' reputation, both positive and
negative, dating from Socrates' time to the current day.
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Except, perhaps, by Kant. But Kant, for all his tremendous philosophical legacy, has not come to be revered as
an excellent person.
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Jaeger, 13.
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At this juncture I would like to pose a question which, while beyond the scope of this
paper, developed out of my examination of the concepts I studied for this project. As I looked at
the differences between deontological ethics and virtue ethics, I began to wonder if Ross' theory
might have more in common with virtue ethics than Kantian deontology.
Ross presents a duty-based ethical theory, and for that reason it is easily classified as a
deontological one. However, several features of his theory deviate from what we expect from
traditional, and especially Kantian, deontology. Ross assumes that prima facie duties are
universal, and that "we know them to be true" because they are the "main moral convictions of
the plain man." 161 Ross believes that these are convictions "of the nature of knowledge," 162 and
does not seem to consider the possibility that the moral convictions of the average person are
learned, and arise from one's culture, and so could change from culture to culture. If our moral
convictions are learned and come out of our culture and our cultural ideas of right and wrong,
then they must be conditional, not universal. If our moral convictions are conditional, then they
cannot provide an absolute and universal basis for our duties. For a deontological theory, this is
a significant problem. For virtue ethics, it makes perfect sense, as a common question in
discussing virtues is "how different kinds of societies encourage different virtues and vices." 163
In addition, Ross believes that when we are in a position such that our prima facie duties
have come into conflict with one another, 164 we must select among them based on which duty "is
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Ross, 21n.
Ross, 23.
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Pence, 256.
164
Ross suggests that this is "perhaps always" the case (19).
162
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more incumbent than any other." 165 He does not explain precisely how we are to do that, and
admits that "our judgements about our actual duty in concrete situations have none of the
certainty that attaches to our recognition of the general principles of duty." 166 We cannot avoid
the question of how such a decision is made. Ross stresses the point that it is not as a result of
looking at which action produces more good, but instead "which is in the circumstances more of
a duty." 167 While I personally do not understand how we can decide which is more of a duty
without looking at the consequences of the action, in either case we are directed to look at the
circumstances of the situation. It is the circumstances that ultimately lead us to determine our
actual duty. Similarly, in virtue ethics it is the circumstances that lead us to determine the
virtuous action. In contrast, Kant believes that we cannot make moral decisions contingent on
circumstances, and any such "hypothetical imperative says only that the action is good for some
possible or actual purpose." 168
For these reasons and others, including Ross' rejection of motive as a means for judging
the moral worth of an action and Ross' acknowledgement that one can never be sure of the
correct action to take in a situation, 169 I see Ross' theory as incorporating aspects of both
deontology and virtue ethics. I suggest that it may be possible to utilize Ross as a bridge
between deontology and virtue ethics, to allow people to act according to duties but also take
consequences into consideration. I believe that this is a question worth further study.

165

Ross, 19.
Ross, 30.
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Ross, 18.
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Kant, 4:414-5.
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I discuss these points in chapter 2.
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